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I. ABSTRACT  
In this paper we present some novel findings on wage differentials between state 
and NGO (Non Government Organization) employees in Afghanistan. We find that high 
wages offered by NGOs, as high as 35 times those offered to civil servants, have strong 
distortionary effects on the local labor market and threaten the future fiscal sustainability 
of the state within a partial equilibrium setting. To complete the argument at a theoretical 
level, we also present a general equilibrium model with multiple equilibria that captures 
the deeper implications of the empirical finding. Among the most significant features of 
the model is the fact that the wage-gap feature can become permanent and lock the 
economy in a suboptimal social equilibrium.  
In light of our empirical finding and theoretical model consistent with the 
empirics we ask what the appropriate policy measures are. We consider, short of the 
extreme and implausible case of shutting down the state sector, three recommendations to 
address the issue and assess the strengths and weaknesses of each. Firstly, the host 
country could cap NGO wages. This, however, may be the hardest for the NGOs to 
adhere to given their internal salary scale policies and the need to maintain horizontal and 
vertical equity. Alternatively, government wages could be raised by a factor to arrive at a 
less distortionary gap. This would require substantial financial resources, which lie 
beyond the capacity of the state and the aid community. Thirdly, the NGOs could make 
contributions proportional to the size of the wage gap to a stabilization fund, earmarked 
to support future wages and redress current distortions. We argue that this qualifies as the 
most desirable policy choice given the conditions on the ground.  
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II. INTRODUCTION  
Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, billions of dollars have been spent in Afghanistan 
through development assistance, yet there is very little evidence of positive change in the 
country. For example, the latest National Human Development Report indicated that 
Afghanistan had moved up only slightly in Human Development Index (HDI), from the 
173rd country in 2004 to the 169th country in 2013. Similarly, a 2008 Oxfam 
International report described aid in Afghanistan as “slow, wasteful, ineffective or 
uncoordinated”. Numerous recent reports by the Office of Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) revealed that tens of billions of dollars have been 
unaccounted for in the Afghanistan reconstruction efforts.  
Although the performance of development assistance may be evaluated in a 
number of ways, this paper has a narrow and focused scope. Specifically, it is an effort to 
analyze and propose workable solutions to “one of the most critical policy issues” 
(Pritchett 2008) facing Afghanistan during the current decade, namely how to improve 
long-term aid effectiveness, focusing on NGO-state wage differentials. Given this 
premise, this paper aims at addressing the following three questions: 
1. What are the current levels of NGO-state wage differentials in Afghanistan?  
2. What are some of the distortionary effects of the wage gap, especially on the 
domestic labor market and future fiscal capacity of the state, at a partial- and 
general equilibrium level?  
3. What can be done to minimize the distortionary effects of the wage gap, 
especially if the solution is supposed to be technically sound, administratively 
feasible and politically supportable? 
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To achieve this end, we begin with a brief discussion of the service delivery in the 
post-Taliban era of Afghanistan. In section IV, we discuss the problem definition and the 
methodology used in this research to analyze the issue. In section V, we discuss the key 
findings of the research, and finally present the recommendations in section VI.  
 
III. BACKGROUND  
Afghanistan’s modern history has been characterized by invasions, wars and civil and 
political unrest. The last three decades of war have especially left damaging blows to the 
country’s autonomy, legitimacy and capacity, not only shattering its physical 
infrastructure and depleting it of its human capital, but also significantly destroying its 
social and institutional capacity to the level that the state is left too weak to perform its 
most basic core functions (Skocpol 1985). Afghanistan dropped to 5th least developed 
country in the world, with higher than 40% unemployment rate, 43 years life expectancy, 
less than 30% of its citizens with access to clean water, and greater than 30% living in 
absolute poverty (NHDR 2007). 
GDP growth has been quite high, starting at a double-digit rate of almost 27% 
right after the fall of the Taliban and ending the year 2014 also in double digit growth 
rate. The high growth rates may be explained by the post-conflict aid effect, with figures 
of foreign aid reaching as high as almost half of GDP or three times the central 
government expenditure. The gradually declining rates of growth may be pointing to the 
start of aid fatigue after a decade of heavy reliance on aid inflows. However, GDP levels 
are one of the lowest in the world, even after adjusting for purchasing power parity. 
Afghanistan has also suffered from one of the highest levels of inflation in the region.  
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Before the events of 9/11 and US invasion of Afghanistan, the NGO and donor 
community were active both inside and outside of Afghanistan, trying to help the poor 
and the disadvantaged through humanitarian services such as those delivered in the 
numerous refugee camps in Pakistan. The hope at that time was that once Afghanistan 
was secure and stable, the government would be able to help its war-strained population, 
and provide jobs and the means of normal living. Following the Bonn Agreement of 
December 2001, millions of Afghan refugees from neighboring countries returned home, 
mostly through the UNHCR repatriation programs. With their return came not only 
NGOs previously operating outside the country but also a whole range of new actors at 
the local, international and multinational levels. For example, according to the Agency 
Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), the number of registered NGOs 
increased from 280 in 2002 to 1,400 in 2008 (only about 350 of which have voluntarily 
registered with different coordinating bodies, the remaining being registered with the 
Ministry of Interior only). Since then, billions of dollars have been pledged, not all of 
which have been committed and at times not all of the committed moneys have actually 
been disbursed. Of the actual amounts disbursed, very little has been put to productive 
use given low absorption capacity and enormous opportunity for corruption.  
For example, at local level, it seems like “starting a new NGO is like opening up a 
new business” and a way to generate employment for oneself and one’s close family and 
friends in addition to many other ways of funds embezzlement (Interviewee No.15). 
International NGOs are suffering from an urgency “to do something” given the crisis at 
hand and their timed grants. As the end of the fiscal year approaches, the NGOs “will do 
anything to make sure that the grant money is spent before the deadline” (Ibid). 
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Multinationals lie on the other extreme – their intricate long term plans seem too neat to 
be feasibly implemented and their goals are rarely met within the set time frame. As 
noted by William Easterly (2005, p.11), perhaps the NGOs are only cows, but are often 
treated as though they were racehorses. Ironically, very little has been learned from past 
failures. More of the same is being done with superficial goals and performance measures 
without taking a pause and reflecting on the past performance.  
To their credit, during this period NGOs have been playing a more vital role in 
implementing projects around the country than the government for a variety of reasons. 
The most important reasons being the government’s lack of capacity to deliver services 
and the NGOs’ increased mobility and flexibility for efficient service delivery. They have 
also been better able to attract a more qualified pool of workforce by offering much 
higher wages than the government. Since most foreign aid has been channeled through 
NGOs, the state and NGOs find themselves in a competing environment, not only 
competing for financial resources, but also for scarce human resources and political 
legitimacy. For example, in 2004-2005 the External Budget, which bypasses the 
government, accounted for about 75% of all assistance. While a lot of such “off-budget” 
support is not unusual in early post conflict situations, it has enormous negative 
consequences for state capacity and legitimacy (Nixon 2007). 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY  
We use both empirical field work approach and a rigorous theoretical modeling 
approach. Empirically, the difficulty in obtaining reliable data, especially on such 
sensitive issue as wages, is a major obstacle to conducting effective research in 
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Afghanistan. Very few functioning labor organizations exist in the country. In such 
circumstances, one obvious place to look for data is in countries in similar situations. The 
challenge, however, is that extensive quantitative data or even qualitative studies are 
extremely rare on this specific topic in other countries, making comparative data difficult 
to obtain.  
Therefore, this research is heavily reliant on qualitative research methodology and 
quantitative data gathering from a representative sample. In particular, we extracted data 
from published documents and reports, and verified the findings through in-depth 
interviewees with people most familiar with and knowledgeable on the issues. In order to 
assess the size of the wage gap and levels of wages offered by different organizations, we 
also gathered specific data on wages across sectors through a standardized Pay and 
Benefits Questionnaire sent along with interview requests to a representative sample of 
government and NGOs employees in the country. Specifically, we contacted 22 
individuals from 17 organizations for interviews, of which 15 individuals from 11 
organizations responded, representing views and data from an array of actors, including 
employees from the government, local and international NGO and donor agencies. We 
believe that the most likely reason for non-respondents is their unwillingness to share 
sensitive and confidential information about pay and benefits. As it is, wages and benefits 
are one of the strongest mechanisms for organizations to compete with one another for 
the limited pool of skilled labor willing to work in Afghanistan.  
The process of data gathering and analysis was as follows: we contacted potential 
interviewees by email or phone initially and provided them with a brief project 
description and official interview request. We obtained consent from all interviewees and 
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provided them assurances of anonymity and confidentiality in writing, unless otherwise 
noted. Some of the interviewees chose to discuss the questions over the phone, while 
others responded by e-mail. After collecting their responses, we analyzed the information 
by recording all the responses and synthesizing key messages related to each question. 
For reasons of confidentiality, we have coded each responded by a number, from 1 to 15.  
The research methodology, including interview questions and processes, were 
reviewed and approved by faculty advisors as well as Committee on the Use of Human 
Subjects at Harvard University. Interviewees were selected based on their knowledge, 
involvement and representation in different sectors. For instance, interviewees included 
individuals ranking from mid-level managers to country directors in organizations such 
as local and international NGOs, NGO coordination bodies and various government 
ministers.  
 
V. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION  
Lack of coordination between state and NGOs, and among NGOs themselves, is 
not a new phenomenon. Duplication of effort was one of the main practical challenges 
that almost anyone working in the region must have witnessed. Almost all evaluations 
identified “lack of coordination” as a major constraint. This paper is addressing the need 
for cooperation and coordination in setting wages in a country where market forces have 
little, if any, effect on ensuring that wages approximate the value of the marginal 
productivity of labor, as suggested by standard economics.  
In fact, our analysis indicates that wages offered in Afghanistan are a function of 
the employers’ ability to pay, not the value of the marginal product of labor. For example, 
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on average a driver with similar qualifications receives a monthly salary of about $40 
from the government, $110 from a small local NGO, $500 from a large international 
NGO and $800+ from the UN or other multinational donor agencies, resulting in a 
maximum wage differential of about twenty times between the lowest and highest paid 
driver. International consultants reportedly receive as high as US$60,000 a month. In 
fact, an Oxfam report found that “each full-time expatriate consultant costs up to half a 
million dollars a year” (Interviewee No.8).  If the higher wages were reflective of higher 
premiums paid to attract better quality employees, one would expect the gap to shrink as 
we move to jobs requiring lower level skills. Although this is true in the data gathered 
here, the gap does not shrink nearly enough to warrant this thesis ample validity. In other 
words, even after controlling for education and skill, wage differentials are large. 
 
Key Empirical Findings 
Now we turn to addressing the three questions posed in the introductory section of 
this paper, the first of which relates to measuring the NGO-state wage gap. Measuring the 
exact size of the wage gap for people of similar skills is challenging for a variety of 
reasons. Firstly, it is hard to find people of same skill levels working for different sectors, 
which is why we opted for the second best option of looking for people with similar skill 
levels. The questionnaire, for instance, asked how much an organization would offer if 
they were to hire someone with the given level of qualifications, which included 
academic qualifications, years of experience, knowledge of languages and basic computer 
skills. In other words, each organization was given a list of hypothetical individuals with 
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given qualifications and they were asked to state a range of salary and benefits that they 
would likely offer these individuals had they been hired in their respective organizations. 
Secondly, there is a wide variety of organizations under the rubric of “NGO” 
including small grassroots organizations as well as well-established international 
organizations, many of whom function as de facto for profit firms. To address this issue, 
weighted average calculation was applied to the observed data. In addition, in order to 
minimize the effect of outliers on the data, donor agency data with much higher salaries 
were excluded from the analysis. Also, four measures of wages were constructed, namely 
wages in the upper bound (the maximum that an organization would offer), the lower 
bound (the minimum that an organization would offer), the median and the mean.  
Thirdly, wage data is confidential in most organizations, thus making it extremely 
difficult to arrive at an accurate measure of the wage gap. To address this concern, all 
organizations were guaranteed anonymity. Besides, many titles were hypothetical – i.e. 
some organizations reported not having any “Health Officer,” but they were asked to 
report how much they would offer him/her if they had one. 
Keeping these caveats in mind, figure 6 shows the median wage distribution of 
local and international NGOs for eight different positions, from program directors to 
security guards. What is obvious from the chart is that at a median level, the highest wage 
earner in this list is an NGO director who may receive an average of $23,000 per year, 
while the lowest wage earner is a janitor or security guard who may receive an average 
pay of US$2,100 per year.  
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At first sight, the distribution above may suggest that variation in median salary 
increases as we move from lower skill level employees to higher skill levels. For 
instance, on average a driver receives an annual salary of US$3,096 ($258/month) with a 
standard deviation of 710 only. A program director, on the other hand, receives an 
average annual salary of US$25,782 ($2,149/month) with a standard deviation of 5,243. 
However, if we look at the standard deviation as a percentage of the mean, it is 23% for 
the driver and only 20% for the program director. The conclusion, therefore, is that there 
is a lot of variation in wages offered by different organizations at different levels, which 
is hard to explain by market forces alone, thus pointing to some kind of arbitrariness in 
salaries offered.  
To find the size of the gap between NGO and government sectors, one would 
need to repeat the analysis carried out above when comparing people of similar skills 
among different NGOs. This kind of analysis includes both good and bad news. The good 
news is that there is little variation among salaries of government employees. The 
government salary scale has 10 grades. The maximum difference between the lowest and 
highest salary is about Afghanis 300 (about US$6 at an exchange rate of Afghanis 
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50/US$1), which is only about 8% of the highest salary. Therefore, we could safely use 
the maximum of the government salary (approximately US$84) as a benchmark to 
compare with any level of NGO salary.  
The bad news, however, is that it is hard to find even people of similar skills and 
qualifications among the government employees to compare with the NGO employees. 
Government employees generally tend to have more experience in government-related 
jobs. NGO employees, on the other hand, are generally comprised of younger cohorts 
with knowledge of the English language and basic computer skills. While this 
generalization may be true at a broader level, exceptions on both sides abound too. 
Furthermore, one would expect that such differences should not matter at lower skill level 
jobs such as a driver, janitor or security guard. The data, however, suggests that the gap 
will not be significantly reduced by moving down the skill level and comparing actual 
salaries in both sectors. 
 
As we can see in Figure 7, a typical NGO employee is paid between two and 22 
times that of the highest paid government employee. If we consider the upper bound of 
NGO wages, the gap increases to as much as about 32 times. If we replace the currently 
fixed government employee wage of US$84 with more accurate actual wages offered by 
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the government for different positions, the size of the gap will obviously deteriorate even 
further. It should be noted that the values used in this analysis include the pure dollar 
amount of pay only, not including benefits such as per diems, health benefits, insurance, 
subsidized services and so on. In some cases, only a day’s per diem for an NGO 
employee could far exceed a government employee’s monthly salary.  
One of the interview questions sought to find out what people thought was the 
cause of the higher wages offered by the NGO sector. The answers varied widely, with 
one answer dominating the rest i.e. they pay higher wages because they can. This pointed 
to the fact that the government would have also paid higher wages if they could afford to 
do so. One interviewee was insisting that he would not call the government pay “salary” 
because it is impossible to meet even the most basic necessities with $40-70 a month 
(Interviewee No.13). The second most common response was calling the NGO 
employees as “more competent” and ones with “higher skills” including English 
language and computer skills. In response, most government employees were asserting 
that government employees have more experience and “NGO workers receive more 
training and capacity building during their work”, thus negating any market 
differentiation before hiring (Interviewee No.15).  
Other answers to this question included the following: there is a lack of care and 
thought in spending “the tax dollars of donor countries” especially when NGOs pay 
exorbitant amounts of money to some consultants (Interviewee No.3); high wages “are 
paid out of the aid budget to poor Afghan people” but “very select few end up benefiting 
from it (Interviewee No.8)”; “donors and contractors are very much for-profit” and 
“consultant and contractor salaries are very high, especially when considered 
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cumulatively” (Interviewee No.12) and finally “high wages are due to market forces” 
suggesting high demand and low supply of qualified workforce (Interviewee No.6). 
Although not explicit, some respondents were suggesting that most NGO wages 
are determined by what “peer organizations” pay, which places an upward pressure on 
wages due to even higher wages offered by donor agencies and multinational 
organizations (Interviewee No.9). Competition for attracting qualified workforce is so 
intense that one respondent found it peculiar that some NGOs “lost staff to government 
ministries” who offer even higher wages than International NGOs for employees 
seconded through the UN or the World Bank (Ibid). 
For some organizations, it seems like higher wages are in part driven by the need 
to maintain some horizontal equity, i.e. pay similar wages for similar positions across 
different countries of operation. For others, higher wages, especially for lower skill levels 
are primarily driven by the need to maintain vertical equity i.e. the bar is set high by 
international staff, which drives the wages upwards for qualified local staff at higher 
positions, which in turn drives the wages upwards for everyone else in the organization.  
What are some of the distortionary effects of this wage gap, especially on the 
labor market and future fiscal capacity of the country?  
There are numerous ways in which the currently high wage gap is distorting the 
labor market and producing undesirable effects. We classify the negative externalities of 
the current wage gap into two groups: first for the domestic labor market and second for 
the future fiscal sustainability of service delivery in the post-aid era when the NGOs 
would have left the country. 
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The most obvious distortion for the domestic labor market is the unhealthy 
competition for the limited pool of qualified work force, which bids the price of labor up 
for a country where the opportunity cost of every dollar is quite significant. Since the 
competition is not only between the NGO sector and the government, but also among 
NGOs themselves, this creates yet further upward pressure on wages, thus paying much 
higher than their value of marginal productivity.  
This may result in some “good” since it can function as efficiency wage, defined 
as wages higher than market-clearing wage set by employers to induce higher 
productivity or improve the applicant pool or raise employee morale. Our research in fact 
supports all these expected results i.e. NGO employees generally tend to have higher 
productivity by exerting higher level of effort; NGOs are able to absorb a more qualified 
workforce, equipped with relatively better skills; and NGO employees generally exhibit 
higher morale, all of which create a virtuous cycle of higher pay resulting in higher 
productivity.  
This result may be “bad” if seen from the perspective of the government, because 
the reverse of all of these results will be true for them, assuming their ability to finance 
higher wage bill has not increased. In fact, the fiscal capacity has not increased much as 
evident from the NAHDR (2007), which shows that the Afghan economy was only able 
to increase its revenue from about 4.5% of GDP in 2004/05 to about 7% in 2006/07, still 
not enough to cover the government wage bill alone. Specifically, although government 
employee wages have not decreased, they felt highly demoralized when they witness 
people of similar skills, and often much less experience, earn many times their wages in 
the NGO sector. This may result in a vicious cycle of low wage and low productivity. It 
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may also be true, however, that since the more qualified are attracted by the NGO sector, 
only the less qualified are left working for the government. In fact, Ashraf Ghani, current 
president, who also used to be Chancellor of Kabul University and Afghan finance 
minister, was one of the earliest ones to note this problem by saying that "within six 
months of starting my job as finance minister, my best people had been stolen by 
international aid organizations who could offer them forty to a hundred times the salary 
we could" (Poston 2006, p.1).  
Another major distortion is the sub-optimal allocation and use of human capital. 
As evident from the ratio of NGO wages to government wages, even the highest paid 
government employee has an incentive to move to the lowest level job in the NGO sector. 
In fact, it is not uncommon to find highly skilled people with university degrees and 
several years of experience working in low skill jobs such as administrative assistant, 
logistics officer or even as drivers or security guards in NGOs, attracted primarily by the 
higher wages. This signifies tremendous loss of scarce human capital, which is 
misallocated due to skewed incentives. It is also not uncommon to see people with 
Medical Doctor’s degrees doing administrative or logistical works.  
Most of these findings were echoed by the interviewees when asked about the 
potentially negative effects of the wage gap, especially at times when the employees of 
the two sectors have to work together. Some of the key responses include the following: 
“the higher-paid staff feel more dominant” (Interviewee No.1); government employees 
are “looked down upon” (Interviewee No.5); “frequent disputes arise which may result in 
failing to achieve the goals of the project” (Interviewee No.10); “government employees 
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have a lot of animosity towards NGO employees” (Interviewee No.14) and “the wage gap 
has created an unhealthy environment between the two sectors” (Interviewee No.15).   
The second key aspect of the negative externality of the wage gap concerns the 
future fiscal capacity of the state to deliver the needed services in the post-NGO era. Two 
key questions can cause a concern. Firstly, what happens to the portion of the domestic 
labor force currently working for the NGO sector? Secondly, who will replace the NGO 
sector and the much work that they are currently doing?  
To answer the first question, regarding the unemployment of the qualified 
workforce, it is only worrying if the portion currently working for the NGOs will not be 
willing to work for lower government wages, or if the government will not be able to 
offer them higher wages comparable to their previous NGO wages.  
The answer to the second question is similarly troubling only if the government’s 
fiscal capacity has not increased to be able to deliver the required services that the NGOs 
are currently delivering, or that the current NGO employees are not willing to work for 
lower government wages. Even if some of the NGO employees will be willing to work 
for the government, either by them lowering their expectations or the government 
offering them slightly higher wages, the interpersonal tension that is created now may be 
too deeply rooted to be resolved later, thus leaving the risk of uncooperative behavior and 
unhealthy working relationships in the future. Having created a dependency on foreign 
aid, the state would be unable to attract the talent they need to run the government 
operations smoothly, thus risking falling back into a fragile or failed state.  
It is these potentially troubling scenarios that this paper is trying to predict, and 
prevent by taking the necessary measures. The case of East Timor after the withdrawal of 
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the international community provides textbook examples of some pitfalls to avoid. A 
report by Carnahan, Durch, & Gilmore (2006) found the negative effect of UN peace 
keeping operations in East Timor as “the largest negative effect” and warned that 
mitigating these effects required “revising the wage setting principles” by organizations 
as large as the UN, whose wages form the new floor based on which other NGOs 
determine their wage levels. 
In fact, in the preceding section, we excluded UN and other donor agency wages 
from the calculation of wage gap, thus underestimating the size of the gap. Including 
these organizations would have driven the gap much higher. As an example, a UN 
National Officer could earn anywhere between US$23,535 and US$63,965 per year, up 
to a ratio of about 63 times of highest paid government employee. Some international 
employees receive a monthly hazard benefits - in addition to their normal pay and 
benefits - which is about 15 times the full salary of highest paid government employee or 
even several times higher than the pay offered to most NGO employees. 
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 Box 1. A Simple Partial Equilibrium Economic Model 
 
 
 
The figures above are an attempt to graphically depict the effect of NGO sector on local 
wages (Figure A) and possible solution to mitigate the effect (Figure B).  
 Figure A, suppose the economy has only L* number of qualified workforce and 
government is the sole provider of employment opportunities. Ls shows the supply of 
qualified workforce while Ld1 (the think black line) shows the demand for qualified 
workforce. The equilibrium level of wage is indicated by W0 and equilibrium level of 
current employment is indicated by L0.  
 As the NGO sector starts operation, they increase the total demand for labor to Ld2 
(the thick blue line). The new demand curve is discontinued after L1 as the NGO sector 
only wants to hire L1 number of employees. This, therefore, pushes the wages up to W1, 
but only hiring L1 number of employees. At this wage, however, all L* number of 
workforce are willing to supply labor, thus creating an excess supply of L1L*. Since L1 
number of “most talented” was drained from the government sector to the NGO sector, 
this leads to an excess demand of equal size in the government sector.  
 Those now working for the NGO are in fact receiving Efficiency Wages, while 
those left with the government feel demoralized as they saw their peers earning much 
higher wages in the NGO sector, thus creating a virtuous cycle for the former and a 
vicious cycle for the latter.  
 Figure B shows one possible solution for the post-NGO era. If all that has changed 
is the departure of NGO sector, there needs to be some way to absorb those left 
unemployed after the NGOs’ departure that would cause the demand curve to shift from 
Ld1 to Ld3. One way to achieve this shift is by using the current level of resources from the 
NGO sector to either private sector to create additional demand or to the government to 
increase their willingness to pay higher wages for more labor.  
 Figure B shows one possible solution for the post-NGO era. If all that has changed 
is the departure of NGO sector, there needs to be some way to absorb those left 
unemployed after the NGOs’ departure that would cause the demand curve to shift from 
Ld1 to Ld3. One way to achieve this shift is by using the current level of resources from the 
NGO sector to either private sector to create additional demand or to the government to 
increase their willingness to pay higher wages for more labor. 
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VI. A NONLINEAR GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL WITH MULTIPLE 
EQUILIBRIA CONSISTENT WITH THE EMPIRICS 
In order to complete our argument we address the problem of formalizing 
complex interactions between labor markets, other markets and the public sector. We 
summarize here the basic structure of a ‘simple’ non-linear model embodying distinct 
markets and public sector which can be applied to analyze the dual labor markets in 
general equilibrium in countries like Afghanistan. At any single point in time, the model 
can be presented as a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) representation of the socio-
economic system.  The key distinction here is the explicitly non-linear nature of the 
economy-wide functional relationships. The key theorem shows the existence of multiple 
equilibria which captures the duality in labor market. Some further considerations of 
complexity and increasing returns show that multiple equilibria are indeed the natural 
outcomes in such models. Thus, there would seem to be some role for domestic policy in 
guiding the economy to a particular equilibrium among many (Khan 2002, 2004, 2013). 
The virtue of an economy-wide general equilibrium approach to labor market 
systems is the embodiment of various inter-sectoral linkages.  In a SAM, such linkages 
are mappings from one set of accounts to another. In terms of dual labor systems with 
wage differentials that persist, the production activities can be broken down into a 
production (sub-) system and a set of public sector activities. In practice, this presents 
considerable difficulties of classification and empirical estimation. The findings above on 
Afghanistan illustrate some of the difficulties. 
The production activities producing value added going to various factors---
particularly to labor which is our focus here, are defined on the input-output subspace of 
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the general and abstract mathematical space X. We denote labor markets in both private 
and public sectors by indexing the vectors of inputs, outputs and value added across the 
specific rows and columns in the input-output matrix. In addition to the values of inputs 
and outputs, points in this space could also represent household and other institutional 
income and expenditure accounts. The key relationship in this context is that between the 
endogenous accounts (usually, production activities and technologies, factors and 
households) and the exogenous ones.  It is this relationship that is posited to be non-linear 
and this together with some assumptions on the relevant mathematical space can lead to 
the existence of multiple equilibria. 
Although the existence theorems for these multisectoral models provide some 
structure for the equilibria as sequences of fixed points in the socio-economic structure 
with evolving technology systems in both the private and public sectors, it is not 
specified a priori which equilibrium will be reached. The problem of equilibrium 
selection thus remains open. This is the policy question that we addressed in partial 
equilibrium model before. We want policies to enable the entire economy to reach the 
maximal fixed points that are attainable. These are in fact reached through a combination 
of market forces and policy maneuvers over time. It is also to be understood that path-
dependence would rule out certain equilibria in the future. Thus initial choices of policies 
in the partial equilibrium context do matter crucially at times. This makes modeling the 
entire economy essential for going towards optimality. 
 
The Model on a Lattice 
 
Define X  as a vector lattice over a subring M  of the real field R . Let 
 0,|  xXxxx  
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A non-linear mapping N  is defined such that 0,: 0   NXXN .  Given a 
vector of exogenous variables d , the following non-linear mapping describes a 
simultaneous non-linear equations model of an economy, :E  
dNxx          (1)  
for a given  Xd . 
This non-linear system represents a socio-economic system of the type described 
previously. In order to specify the model further, the following assumptions are 
necessary.  
X  is order complete 
N  is an isotone mapping 
3.   xˆ  such that dxNx  ˆˆ  
 
In terms of the economics of the model, the non-linear mapping from the space of 
inputs to the space of the outputs allows for non-constant returns to scale and technical 
progress over time. The 3 assumptions are minimally necessary for the existence of 
equilibrium. Assumption 3, in particular ensures that there is some level of output vector 
which can be produced given the technical production conditions and demand structure. 
 
Existence of Multiple Equilibria:  
Theorem: Under the assumptions 1 - 3, there exists  Xx
*
 so that 
*x  is a 
solution of  
dNxx   
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Proof: Consider the interval    xxXxxx   ˆ0,ˆ|ˆ,0  where xˆ  is defined as 
in assumption 3.  Take a mapping F . 
dNxXxF  :  
F  is isotone and maps  x,0  into itself. 
Define a set 
  FxxxxxD  ,,0
. 
By assumption 3, D  is non-empty. 
We now show Dx inf
*   is a solution to dNxx  . Dx inf
*  ; therefore 
Dxxx  ,* . F  is isotone; therefore xFxFx 
*
 for each Dx   implying. 
 
** xFx   
From (2) we have  
** FxFxF  . Thus DFx 
*
; hence 
** inf FxDx   so, 
*** FxxFx  . Therefore 
** Fxx  . 
This is an application of Tarski’s and Birkhoff’s theorem.  The key feature to note 
here is that the equilibrium is not necessarily unique.  It should also be noted that under 
additional assumptions on space X  and the mapping N  the computation of a fixed point 
can be done by standard methods (e.g. Ortega and Rheinboldt). 
 
Multiple Equilibria on Banach Space:   
 
In this section the results for multiple equilibria are extended to functionals on 
Banach Space. We can define the model again for monotone iterations, this time on a 
non-empty subset of an ordered Banach space X . The mapping XXf :  is called 
compact if it is continuous and if  xf  is relatively compact.  The map f  is called 
completely continuous if f  is continuous and maps bounded subsets of X  into compact 
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sets.  Let X  be a non-empty subset of some ordered set Y .  A fixed point x  of a map 
XXN : is called minimal (maximal) if every fixed point y  of N  in X  satisfies 
  xyyx   
Theorem: Let  PE, be an ordered Banach space and let D  be a subset of E .   
Suppose that EDf :  is an increasing map which is compact on every order 
interval in D . If there exist ,y  Dy ˆ with yy ˆ  such that  yfy  and   yyf ˆˆ  , 
then f  has a minimal fixed point x .  Moreover, yx   and  yFx
klim . That is, the 
minimal fixed point can be computed iteratively by means of the iteration scheme 
 yx 0  
 
 kk xfx 1   ,....2,1,0k  
Moreover, the sequence 
 kx  is increasing. 
Proof: Since f  is increasing, the hypotheses imply that f  maps the order interval 
 yy,  into itself.  Consequently, the sequence  kx  is well-defined and, since it is 
contained in  yyf , , it is relatively compact.  Hence it has at least one limit point.  By 
induction, it is easily seen that the sequence 
 kx  is increasing.  This implies that it has 
exactly one limit point x  and that the whole sequence converges to x . Since  is 
continuous, x  is a fixed point of f .  If x  is an arbitrary fixed point in D  such that 
yx  , then, by replacing y  by x  in the above argument, it follows that xx  . Hence x  
is the minimal fixed point of f  in   DPy  .  It should be observed that we do not 
claim that there exists a minimal fixed point of f  in D . 
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We can also show that if dNxXxF  :  is an intersecting compact map in 
a non-empty order interval   xx ˆ,  and Fxx   and xxF ˆˆ   then F  has a minimal fixed 
point 
*x  and a maximal fixed point 
**x .  Moreover,  xFx
klim*   and  xFx
k ˆlim**  . 
The first of the above sequences is increasing and the second is decreasing. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
We have now shown empirically the persistence of wage differentials in 
Afghanistan. We have also offered both partial and general equilibrium explanations. 
What policy recommendations can lead towards optimality in such a distorted economy 
as in Afghanistan? 
Having addressed the first two questions posed in the introductory section of this 
paper, namely estimating the size of the gap and examining the negative effects of the 
gap on local labor market, we now turn to the third question above, the answer to which 
lies in the recommendations below. Based on the findings in the previous sections of this 
paper, we are proposing three potential policy choices, each to be examined with their 
strengths and weaknesses in the context of Afghanistan. The criteria against which the 
success of each policy choice would be determined are three. The policy design must be: 
i) technically sound i.e. getting the causal chains from action to outcomes right; ii) 
politically supportable i.e. ensuring the political environment is right to bring about and 
sustain change; and iii) administratively feasible i.e. ensuring proposed change is 
implementable with existing capacities and resources. The three policy recommendations 
are the following: 
i) Cap the NGO wages: This policy would require imposing a ceiling on NGO 
wages. Although administratively the most efficient, it is the least politically 
supportable option, especially given the fact that most NGOs have their own 
internal wage policies and salary scale. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, 
NGOs need to maintain both horizontal and vertical equity. Imposing a cap on 
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the wages will limit their ability to comply with their internal policies and to 
maintain equity.  
ii) Raise the wages for the government employees to arrive at a desirable gap: 
This policy option would necessitate determining the optimal increase in 
government wages given the wage level of the NGO sector, the analysis of 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. This would also increase the wage 
bill and impose further strains on the already fragile fiscal position of the 
government. It would not be feasible unless external financial support is made 
available up to a time when the government is able to raise its own revenues 
high enough to pay for the increased expenditure. On a brighter note, such a 
move has already been under way in the policy discussions in Afghanistan. In 
fact, the last parliamentary hearing increased the government salary scale to a 
large extent.  
While this policy choice may score high on political supportability, it 
would score low both on implementability as well as on technical soundness. 
It is low on implementability because of the lack of adequate available 
resources to support a higher wage bill. It will score low on technical 
soundness mainly because it will address the symptom, but not the underlying 
cause, of the problem. The incentives of the two sectors seem to be 
misaligned, each trying to optimize their own objective function without 
heeding the general equilibrium effects. The most appropriate policy choice 
should therefore address issues of incentives as well.  
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iii) NGOs should contribute to a wage stabilization fund: This is the most 
desirable of the three policy options in that it seems technically right, 
politically supportable and administratively feasible. Although it does not 
directly close the gap, it first provides the NGO leaders with an incentive to 
reduce their wages relative to government wages. Secondly, it provides the 
government with an alternative source of revenue with which to stabilize 
future wages in the post-NGO era. This, however, has the increased 
administrative burden of actually measuring the wages for people of 
comparable skills and experiences, measuring the gap, and enforcing a 
mutually agreed upon level of contribution. Such a comprehensive analysis is 
also beyond the scope of this paper and may be taken up in future research.  
 
A final remark about growth of the Afghan economy in a dynamic general equilibrium 
setting can tell us more about the long run viability of the second option. In the short run 
the third option may be practical. But an economy cannot be forever dependent on 
outside help. Therefore, we need to ask what development strategy can lead Afghanistan 
to a sequence of high wage equilibria. As studies of East Asian Development show, an 
export led viable learning economy can be created under certain conditions. Strategically 
then, this is the question that policy makers need to ask and answer.    
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